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bstract
This study provides a characterization of the Association of the South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) banking system’s competition under the new
nvironment that the implementation of the Financial Integration Framework (AFIF) implies. We focus on the largest banking markets in the region,
epresented by the ASEAN-5. The period under study is 2007–2016, covering the preparation period of the ASEAN banks to fully implement
he new Banking Integration Framework (ABIF) in 2020. Panzar and Rosse non-structural approach is utilised to measure the competition level.
ollowing Goddard and Wilson’s (2009) disequilibrium approach, the test for the dynamic competition measure is also conducted as a robustness
heck. We examine the evolution of the banking competition by observing the trend of the competition level using a rolling estimation with a 5-year
indow. This paper also investigates the factors that may influence the competitive conditions, specifically controlling for structural conditions
nd institutional characteristics. Our main findings confirm that banks operate under monopolistic competition, although there is still a high level
f heterogeneity among the ASEAN countries’ banking market and banking integration sure is a challenging objective for the region. Our results
eveal a positive relationship between density of demand, concentration and competition. 2018 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).













has important implications for financially integrated regions,
with the latest development being the Association of the South
East Asian Nation (ASEAN).2 The aim of the ASEAN Bank-eywords: ASEAN banking market; Competition; Panzar and Rosse; Disequil
.  Introduction
Assessing the effects of competition on financial stability
s an important question for both policymakers and antitrust
uthorities alike. Prior to the global financial crisis, a num-
er of studies have emphasized the role of competition in the
anking industry (e.g. Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Claessens and
aeven, 2004; Beck et al., 2006). Those studies are focusing on
nvestigating the relationship between competition and several
ifferent factors including the market structure, market con-
estability, banks’ efficiency, banks’ risk-taking behaviour and
nancial stability. Indeed, one would expect that when banks
perate in a more competitive environment they may be more
ikely to engage in competitive policies achieving higher levels
f performance and other efficiencies (Chortareas, et al., 2013,
016). Increased competition is also expected to ease up access
o financial services and external financing for wider population,
mprove the quality and innovation of the financial products,
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nd overall lead to an improvement of the country’s economic
elfare.
On the other hand, competition may not necessarily lead
o financial stability.1 Competition has been blamed to trig-
er an increase in risk taking activities by banks, especially
hen they are forced to offer their services at more competi-
ive prices (Schaeck et al., 2009; Allen et al., 2011). With the
lobal financial crisis of 2008–09, the spill over effect of the
risis is even greater where the dangers of a high-risk culture in
anking have generated a demand for the reassessment of the
rudential rules currently in place (see e.g. G30, 2009; Acharya
nd Richardson, 2009; Chortareas et al., 2011). This in turns1 In this context, two views exist in the literature: the competition-fragility
nd the competition-stability (see Berger et al., 2009).
2 One of the major backdrops triggering for such study is the financial integra-
ion as has been done by several regions in the world including European Single
arket, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Asia-Pacific Eco-
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ng Integration Framework (ABIF) is to promote competition,
o achieve better financial inclusion and provision of finan-
ial services, stronger regional banking markets, and eventually
tronger regional economic growth (Khan et al., 2016a, 2016b).
Yet, the existing empirical evidence on financial integration
nd stability is scant, especially considering the timeliness of
he issue and the recent financial turmoil and bank insolvencies.
his paper contributes to the existing literature in several aspects:
rst, it focus on the ASEAN banking market providing insights
egarding the current banking market competition level and its
ountry specific factors that have important policy implications
or the region, especially in light of the coming implementation
f ABIF. We expect the current competition level among the
SEAN-5 countries to vary given the differences in the nature
f the banking industry of each country within the region.
Second, it uses recent data covering the global financial crisis
f 2008–09 and the post crisis period. We also examine the evolu-
ion of the banking competition on ASEAN-5 level, representing
he region’s condition, for the period 2007–2016, by observing
he trend of the competition level using a rolling estimation with
 5-year window. Our analysis also consider two sub-sample
eriods, with 2011 as the break point, to examine how the com-
etition level of the ASEAN banking market is affected by the
doption of ASEAN Financial Integration Framework (AFIF), in
hich ABIF is one of the endorsed frameworks. Third, it focuses
xplicitly on the ASEAN-5 countries (e.g. Indonesia, Malaysia,
hilippines, Singapore, and Thailand) where the literature on the
opic is very limited. The choice to focus on ASEAN-5 coun-
ries is driven by the fact that ABIF will firstly be implemented
o the ASEAN-5 countries before completely implemented to
he whole ASEAN region.3
Fourth, it uses additional sensitivity analysis using the dis-
quilibrium approach (Goddard and Wilson, 2009), to test for
isequilibrium market conditions at each point in time during the
bserved period. Finally, it controls for several selected country
pecific characteristics to examine the factors determining the
ompetition level in the ASEAN banking market.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
eviews the existing literature on banking competition. Section 3
resents the methodology and data sources. Section 4 discussed
he empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.
.  Literature  reviewThe recent global economic and financial crisis puts the com-
etition discussion on a new basis rendering the conflicting
pproaches that either view competition as a panacea or demo-
omic Cooperation (APEC), and most recently ASEAN (Association of South
ast Asian Nation) with its ASEAN Economic Community (AEC).
3 Since ASEAN-5 countries are the five largest economies in the ASEAN
egion (together they count for more than 87% of the region’s total GDP since
007–2016), the use of the five countries as sample should be sufficient to
epresent the condition of the whole region. Finally, the limited data availability
f the remaining ASEAN-5 countries (Cambodia, Brunei Darussalam, Laos,
yanmar, and Vietnam) provides a constraint for us to perform a proper research
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ize. According to the “competition-fragility” view, competition
riggers risk-taking behaviour of banks given their reduced fran-
hise value due to eroded market power and competition. On the
ther hand, competition can create a level playing field, which
an lead to improved bank efficiency and the overall country’s
conomy. Competition can also improve a country’s financial
tability, as increased competition may reduce banks market
ower, and their ability to charge higher interest loan to cus-
omers that most likely will lead to an increase in non-performing
oan (NPL), and hence riskiness of the banks’ portfolio. This is
nown as “competition-stability” view.
Berger et al. (2009) argue that these two views are not con-
radicting each other. Their finding shows some support to the
competition-fragility” view where banks with higher market
ower tend to have less risk exposure. At the same time, the
esults also show some support to the opposing view that market
ower increases loan risk portfolio. This suggests that increased
arket power does not have to lead to an increase in overall
isks. Banks may choose mitigating techniques (such as increase
f capital, selective loan portfolio, etc.) to protect their franchise
alue, which also might be imposed through regulations set by
egulator. Beck et al. (2012) and Fu et al. (2014) also emphasize
he importance of the right regulatory reform in order to pre-
ent the negative impact of competition on stability. They point
ut several factors in forming regulatory policies in the light
f increased competition including the importance of entry and
ctivity restriction, deposit insurance scheme, risk-taking incen-
ives, and market structure. Overall, competition has been of a
articular interest of academics and policymakers in a sense that
f the right competition policies are in place, we might expect
 competitive, efficient and also stable banking system. As sug-
ested by Allen and Gale (2004), a complex and multi-faceted
ause and effect relationship between regulation and competi-
ion as well as financial stability calls for a sound policy which
ake into consideration all factors that work both on theoretical
nd empirical level.
Aside from discussions on relationship between competition
nd stability, the vast majority of the literature on banking com-
etition focuses on the relationship between bank competition
nd other factors such as market structure, efficiency, and con-
estability. Most of the literature study the developed markets,
uch as Europe especially in relation to the implementation of
he Single Market initiative for the European Union (e.g. Bikker
nd Groeneveld, 1998; Chortareas et al., 2011). Other studies
nclude Bain (1951) and Shaffer (1982) for the United States
nd Matthews et al. (2007) for the United Kingdom. Interna-
ional studies include Claessens and Laeven (2004) for a total
f 50 developing and developed countries.
Molyneux et al. (1994) study the competitive conditions
n major European Country for the period between 1986 and
989 and find that banks in Germany, United Kingdom, France,
nd Spain operate under monopolistic condition, whereas in
taly banks operate under monopoly or collusive oligopoly. On
nother paper, Molyneux et al. (1996) find that the competitive-
ess in the Japanese commercial banks experience some changes
etween the period 1986 and 1988 where it was under monopoly





























































































an unbalanced panel of 1512 bank observations. Table 1 illus-
trates the number of banks included in the sample, per year andA. Ventouri / Review of Devel
ith large samples by Bikker and Haaf (2002) investigate the
ompetition across 23 industrialized countries including coun-
ries in Europe, US, Canada, and Japan. They provide evidence
f monopolistic conditions in most of the countries and per-
ect competition in a few cases. Finally, Claessens and Laeven
2004) measure use a sample of 50 countries from both indus-
rialised and developing countries for the period 1994–2001.
he evidence broadly suggests monopolistic condition in all
ountries.
On the other hand, ASEAN, as a developing region has been
laying an increasingly important role in the economy.4 With an
verage growth rate of around 5% in the past 10 years, compared
o the world’s average GDP growth rate of around 3% for the
ame period, ASEAN is considered as a fast-growing emerg-
ng markets. However, although several studies have measured
he level of competition in the different banking markets, the
ajority of these studies tend to cover large international cross-
ountry data samples or developed economies, and only few
xist for the ASEAN banking market. With ASEAN’s notable
conomic growth, its ability to withstand the effect of the recent
nancial crisis, and most importantly, the coming implementa-
ion of ASEAN Banking Integration Framework (ABIF), it is
ot surprising that researchers are now turning their attention to
his region.
In terms of banking integration, Hamid and Lean (2016) for
ndonesian Capital Market Review, investigate the readiness of
he ASEAN-5 countries for a banking integration by measuring
he convergence level in price or return of assets with similar
haracteristics of the commercial banks in the ASEAN-5 coun-
ries. The results confirm that interest rates in the ASEAN-5
ommercial banking sector are converging, which shows that it
s ready for an integration. One of the studies considering the
ompetition level in ASEAN is Claessens and Laeven (2004)’s
ho sample comprises of 50 countries (both industrialised and
eveloping), including 3 of the ASEAN-5 countries (namely
ndonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines). They estimate the
anzar and Rosse H-Statistic  on the basis of four models varying
n terms of estimation techniques as well as in terms of depen-
ent variables for robustness purpose. They results suggest that
ountries are operating under monopolistic competition for the
bserved period.
Liu et al. (2012) focus on four South East Asian commer-
ial banking market, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
nd Vietnam, to examine how competition affects bank risk
aking behaviour for a period between 1998 and 2008. Sim-
larly, to the majority of banking competition literature, they
lso utilize the Panzar and Rosse H-Statistic  and they use two
ependent variables for robustness purposes. The results suggest
hat banks operate under monopolistic competition. Their study
lso show that competition does not increase bank risk-taking
ehaviour and that concentration is inversely related to bank risk,
hereas regulatory restrictions positively influence bank risk-
4 It has a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of USD 2554.70 billion
nd a total population of around 639 million as of end-2016, according to data
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aking. Khan et al. (2016a), observe the role of competition in
onetary policy transmission through the bank-lending channel.
hey use two structural (CR5 and HHI) and two non-structural
Lerner Index and Boone Indicator) indices as proxies for com-
etition. They conclude, assuming all measures refer to the true
ompetition level, is that the decreased level of competition in
he banking industry weakens the monetary policy transmis-
ion. Khan et al. (2016b) examines the role of market structure
or growth in 10 emerging Asian counties providing evidence
n favour of bank competition suggesting that financially depen-
ent industries grow more in industries characterized by more
ompetition.
In one of the most recent studies, Khan et al. (2017b) examine
he relationship between efficiency, growth and concentration
n the ASEAN region. The results suggest that efficient banks
re able to grow faster which in turn results in higher market
oncentration and power. On a more recent study, Khan et al.
2018) provide evidence supporting the S-C-P hypothesis for the
SEAN banking industry. Finally, Noman et al. (2017) examine
he effect of competition on financial stability of the commercial
anking market in ASEAN countries. They find that an increase
n competition along with decrease in market power will encour-
ge banks to hold more capital and take less credit risk, which
n turn enhances banks’ financial stability.
Nonetheless, the existing empirical evidence is inconclusive
nd scant, especially considering the timeliness of the issue fol-
owing the implementation of the ASEAN BIF, and this is the
ask that we pursue in the following sections.
.  Data  and  methodology
.1.  Data  sources
The dataset used in this study is composed of individual bank
ata sourced from unconsolidated statements of banks operat-
ng in the five ASEAN countries, as made available through
he Orbis and Fitch Connect database.5 Data for country spe-
ific characteristics are collected from the World Bank database,
ncluding the size of land area (in square kilometre), concentra-
ion ratio (CR3 and CR5), and the number of bank branches per
00,000 adults as a proxy for banks density. The chosen time
pan is 2007 to 2016. We focus on commercial banking, which
omprises one of the largest segments of depository institutions
n ASEAN. We have also scrutinized the data to avoid incon-
istencies, reporting errors, and double counting of institutions.
mplementing the aforementioned screening methods, results inountry.
5 Specifically, for data on ASEAN banking market, Fitch Connect has a more
omplete database for each country sample especially in terms of period avail-
bility of bank level financial data. Hence, we primarily use data from Fitch
onnect. We then manually screen to ensure there is no missing bank names,
issing values, double entries, and other inconsistencies.
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Table 1
Data distribution by country and year.
Year Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Observation by year
2007 33 25 18 3 15 94
2008 42 31 18 5 18 114
2009 47 31 19 6 18 121
2010 53 34 19 6 19 131
2011 61 38 22 6 20 147
2012 74 38 21 6 20 159
2013 103 38 21 6 20 188
2014 110 39 21 5 21 196
2015 109 38 20 5 21 193




























































tion process of a bank given its main function as a financial
intermediary to transfer funds from the party with excessumber of bank observations 739 340 1
ource: Orbis and Fitch Connect.
Selected descriptive statistics for the dependent and indepen-
ent variables are presented in Table 2. With respect to data
vailability, we experience very limited information for banks
n Singapore. We note that out of the 128 commercial banks
isted by Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS),6 there are
ess than 10 bank names listed in either Orbis or Fitch Connect.
ccording to MAS, out of the 128 commercial banks, 5 are local
anks and 123 are foreign banks, with only 29 of those foreign
anks (one-fifth) offer full banking services. Given that data for
oreign bank subsidiaries/branches/representative offices are not
ublicly available, the availability of data is very limited for the
ase of Singapore and the analysis is based on this sample size
er year. Nevertheless, the banks included in the sample account
or a largest proportion of the total assets of Singaporean banks,
ence we treat this sample as a representative one.7
.2.  Measuring  bank  competition:  the  Panzar  and  Rosse
odel
To measure competition we use the Panzar and Rosse
1987) H-statistic. This statistic allows distinguishing among
ligopolistic, competitive and monopolistically competitive
arkets. The H-statistic  is a non-structural test, as it assesses
he competitive behaviour of banks without using information
n the structure of the banking market. It is calculated using the
ollowing reduced form revenue estimations (run on a panel data
et) for each country:
ln TRit =  β1 ln P1,it +  β2 ln P2,it +  β3 ln P3,it +  γ1
ln EQASTit +  γ2 ln ASTit +  γ3 ln LOANASTit
+γ4 ln CASHDEPit +  γ5 ln OBSASTit +  εit
(1)or t = 1,...T, where T is the number of periods observed and
 = 1,...I, where I is the total number of banks. The dependent
6 As of June 2017.
7 Data available are mostly for the 5 local Singapore banks, namely DBS Bank
td., Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Ltd., United Overseas Bank Ltd.,
ar Eastern Bank Ltd., and Bank of Singapore Ltd., which are the 5 biggest
anks in the country. Moreover, the first 3 banks are deemed as the 3 biggest








ariable TRit is the ratio of total revenue to total assets. We use
hree inputs (labour, capital and deposits) to describe the pro-
uction process of banks: lnP1 is the average cost of labour
personnel expenses/total assets)8; lnP2is the average cost of
eposits (interest expenses/customer and short term funding);
nd finally lnP3 is the average cost of capital (total capital
xpenses/total fixed assets).
This model examines the effect of the change in factor input
rices (i.e. independent variables) to the revenues (i.e. depen-
ent variables) earned by banks. In other words, it captures
he elasticity of bank’s revenues to input prices. Essentially,
ll banks will experience an increase on their marginal cost
iven an increase in factor input prices. However, the reaction
f each banks towards that change will be different depend-
ng on the type of market that those banks are belong in. In a
erfect competition market, an increase in input prices, which
aise the marginal costs, will force several firms to eventu-
lly exit the market, resulting in an increase of demand for
he remaining firms which then leads to an increased in sell-
ng price and hence revenues by the same amount as the rise
n costs. In a monopolistic market, the increase in costs will
ead to an increase of revenues at a rate slower than the rate
f increase in the costs. Meanwhile, in a monopoly market,
he condition is explained by the theory that profit maximising
rms operates on a price-elastic portion of market demand func-
ion (Goddard and Wilson, 2009). Hence, an increase in input
rices will increase marginal costs, which leads to a decrease
n the output, and consequently resulted in a decline in total
evenues.
We use the intermediation approach to explain the produc-f funds to parties in need of funds.9 We use three inputs
8 Due to lack of data on the number of employees for many banks in our
ample, we use personnel expenses to total assets as an indicator of unit labour
osts.
9 Unlike the ordinary production approach where a bank’s production pro-
ess involves transforming inputs which include labour and capital into
utputs/products which includes loans and deposits, intermediation approach
onsiders deposits as one of the inputs and the loans as one of the outputs.
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Table 2
Selected descriptive statistics per country: min, max, mean, and standard deviations for 2007–2016.a
Descriptive statistics
of dataset per country
for period 2007–2016
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines




0.02 0.27 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.06 0.02
ROA* = 1 + return on
asset








0.00 0.40 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.02 0.02
P3 = total capital
expenses/total fixed
assets





0.00 0.86 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.96 0.13 0.11 0.01 0.65 0.13 0.07
AST = total assets 18.57 71,747.60 4,177.04 9,779.66 103.64 129,487.70 14,015.80 21,972.42 17.13 43,946.18 7387.85 8560.98
LOANAST = total
loans/total assets
0.05 0.89 0.65 0.11 0.00 1.16 0.52 0.21 0.00 0.70 0.44 0.14




0.00 0.69 0.09 0.06 0.00 4.14 0.29 0.36 0.01 0.44 0.13 0.11
OBSAST = OBS/total
assets
0.00 3.21 0.13 0.17 0.00 13.52 0.78 1.50 0.00 3.00 0.20 0.41
Descriptive statistics
of dataset per country
for period 2007–2016
Singapore Thailand




0.01 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.02
ROA* = 1 + return on
asset








0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.01
P3 = total capital
expenses/total fixed
assets





0.06 0.22 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.81 0.17 0.14
AST = total assets 617.70 292,364.65 103,256.50 89,302.09 167.77 82,733.67 19,551.20 23,518.26
LOANAST = total
loans/total assets
0.10 0.73 0.48 0.16 0.20 0.91 0.67 0.13




0.00 0.18 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.02
OBSAST = OBS/total
assets
0.06 1.29 0.40 0.25 0.00 15.24 0.78 2.20
Sources: Fitch Connect and Author’s calculation.










































































on a number of country specific characteristics. Specifically, we
develop a model where the competition measure is regressed to
10 As Claessens and Laeven (2004) point out, in equilibrium ROA should not
be related to input prices.32 A. Ventouri / Review of Devel
labour, capital and deposits) to describe the production pro-
ess of banks: lnP1 is the average cost of labour (personnel
xpenses/total assets); lnP2 is the average cost of deposits (inter-
st expenses/customer and short term funding); and finally lnP3
s the average cost of capital (total capital expenses/total fixed
ssets). The dependent variable TRit is the ratio of total rev-
nue to total assets. Unlike to other studies that only consider
nterest revenue, we also include both interest and non-interest
evenue (i.e. other operating revenue). We view that the current
anking market condition has forced banks to be more innova-
ive in expanding their source of revenue including from fee-
nd commission-based products and off-balance sheet activ-
ties. According to this view, in a competitive environment
anks are competing in both interest and non-interest income
Shaffer, 1982; Nathan and Neave, 1989; De Bandt and Davis,
000). Hence, distinction between the two become less rele-
ant.
Several bank-specific control variables are also included in
he regression formula to control for potential differences in
osts, size, risk, structure and product mix. Specifically, EQAST
s the ratio of equity to total assets (to control differences in
isk propensity); AST is the logarithm of total assets (to control
or potential size effects); LOANAST is the ratio of total loans
o total assets (to control for asset composition); CASHDEP
s the ratio of cash and due from institutions to total deposits
to capture differences in the deposit mix). Finally, OBSAST is
qual to off balance sheet activities over total assets (to control
or differences in the business mix). Eq. (1) is estimated by
unning a panel data set with fixed effects, controlling for the
ank-specific component to allow for heterogeneity across the






If the H-statistic  takes the value of zero or a negative value
hen the competitive structure is either a monopoly or a perfect
olluding oligopoly. When the H-statistic  is equal to 1, it indi-
ates perfect competition whereas a value between zero and one
ndicates monopolistic competition. Therefore, the bigger the
alue of the H-Statistic  indicates a stronger degree of competi-
ion in a market and that the changing patterns of H-Statistic  over
ime represents changes in the degree of competition throughout
he time. Vesala (1995) and Bikker and Haaf (2002) suggest that
ontinuous interpretation of H-Statistic  as well as comparison
cross countries or banking markets and time period is correct
nder stronger assumptions, more specifically the constant or
dentical price elasticity of demand for the various markets.
Given that the PR model is only valid if the market is in
quilibrium, we also undertake the tests on observations that
re in long-run equilibrium. The equilibrium test is performed
y recalculating Eq. (1) after replacing the dependent variable
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n assets (ROA). Thus, we estimate the following equation for
ach country:
ln ROAit =  β1 ln P1,it +  β2 ln P2,it +  β3 ln P3,it
+γ1 ln EQASTit +  γ2 ln ASTit +  γ3 ln LOANASTit
+γ4 ln CASHDEPit +  γ5 ln OBSASTit +  εit
(3)
Specifically, the dependent variable is computed as
OA′ = ln(1 + ROA) in order to be adjusted for small and neg-






E-statistic measures the sensitivity of profit with respect to the
hanges in input factor prices and is calculated as the sum of the
actor input prices’ coefficients. We then test whether E-statistic
s statistically equal to zero using the F-test statistic.10
We further carry out a sensitivity analysis for robustness using
o test for disequilibrium condition in the market. Especially for
conomies that are in transitional, the adjustment towards equi-
ibrium might not happen instantly, leading to a market condition
hat is out of long-run equilibrium, which in turn can result
n biased H-Statistic. Goddard and Wilson (2009) propose a
ynamic version, as opposed to the normal static version, of the
educed revenue equation.11 Thus, we re-estimate Eq. (1) as:
ln TRit =  β0TRi,t−1 +  β1 ln P1,it +  β2 ln P2,it
+β3 ln P3,it +  γ1 ln EQASTit +  γ2 ln ASTit
+γ3 ln LOANASTit +  γ4 ln CASHDEPit
+γ5 ln OBSASTit +  εit
(5)
This dynamic equation eliminates the requirement for long-
un equilibrium assumptions because the coefficient estimates
f the lagged dependent variable can be used to directly asses
he speed of adjustment towards equilibrium. The unbiased H-




1 −  β0 (6)
.3.  Determinant  of  competition
To identify factors that can explain differences in competi-
iveness across the ASEAS baking market, we use a two-step
pproach and we regress the H-Statistic  (derived from Eq. (1))11 One of the techniques to produce a dynamic panel estimator that they suggest
s the one-step generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure by Arellano
nd Bond (1991), which introduce a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand

























































































framework, banks in the ASEAN region has taken differentA. Ventouri / Review of Devel
he following factors:
Hi =  α  +  α1 ln DEPKM2 +  α2 ln INTERM
+α3BANKSPOP  +  α4 ln CRk  +  εi (7)
here, Hi is the estimated H-Statistic  (derived from Eq. (1)) for
ountry I; DEPKM  2 is a proxy for the density of demand (mea-
ured as total deposits over square km of land area); INTERM
s the intermediation ratio (measured as loans over deposits);
ANKSPOP is the number of bank branches per 100,000 adults;
Rk is the concentration measure (measure by the CR ratio).
We expect a positive sign for the DEPKM  2 coefficient as
n increase in density of demand would attract more firms and
ence more competition. For the intermediation ratio INTERM,
e expect a negative coefficient as the higher the loans to deposit
atio is the less deposit is required to produce loans, which
ndicates a low cost of intermediation and is a sign of low compe-
ition. BANKSPOP coefficient (a proxy for density of banks) is
xpected positive, as the higher the number of banks in the pop-
lation is, the more competitive the market should be. Finally,
f the traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance theory holds,
he concentration ratio (CRk) variable is expected negative, sug-
esting that an increase in market concentration should restrict
arket’s competitiveness.
.  Empirical  results
.1.  The  Panzar  and  Rosse  H-Statistic  measure
Before applying the Panzar and Rosse model to test for mar-
et competitiveness, we first run an equilibrium test to ensure
he requirement for long-run equilibrium in the market. Table 3
resents the E-Statistic estimates for the whole sample period
etween 2007 and 2016 along with the result of the F-test with
 null hypothesis of E = 0.
The results show that, on the ASEAN-5 level, the E-Statistic
stimation is not significantly different from zero. This is also
onfirmed by the country level E-Statistic estimation values
anging from −0.006 to 0.008. This suggest that when the mar-
et is in equilibrium, the increase in input prices will have a
inimum to no effect on banks’ profitability. This is also con-
rmed by the F-test, which fails to reject the null hypothesis both
t the ASEAN-5 and at a country level. The above results imply
hat the banking markets are in long-run equilibrium throughout
he observed period.To ensure the robustness of our result as well as to capture
he evolution and the dynamic of ASEAN banking market con-
ition, we also conducted the equilibrium test on a rolling basis
ollowing Matthews et al. (2007). The rolling estimation is con-
ucted using a 5-year window and is done repeatedly for every
 year gap. The result, as presented in Table 4. The F-test result
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he ASEAN banking market is indeed in equilibrium throughout
he observed period.12
Following the empirical literature on competition, we esti-
ate the reduced form revenue specification in Eq. (1) a panel
ata framework. Table 5 reports the regression results. The
stimated H-Statistic  is 0.564 at the ASEAN level, thus indicat-
ng monopolistic competition in the ASEAN banking market.
he variety of H-Statistic  estimates for each country shows
he difference in level of competition of each country, which
s in line with our expectation. As mentioned in Section 3.2,
e treat the H-Statistic  as a continuous measure of competi-
ion, which is comparable across countries. Therefore, we can
ank the countries’ banking market from the most competi-
ive one to the least one, i.e. Thailand (0.823) with the highest
-Statistic  followed by Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, and
nally Singapore (0.438). These results are in line with the result
rom previous studies done by Claessens and Laeven (2004) and
iu et al. (2012) for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines for
eriod 1994–2001 and 1998–2008, respectively.
Banking integration is expected not only to increase com-
etition in the region, but also to lead to a convergence of the
ompetition level in each country. Banks in countries with higher
ompetition level may not be affected by the increased compe-
ition compared to the smaller ones. However, it may also be
he case that the leading banks from the less competitive coun-
ries are the ones dominating the regional market. For example,
ingapore has the lowest competition level, however its mar-
et is dominated by three large banks (namely DBS Bank Ltd.,
CBC Ltd., and UOB Ltd.) with strong presence at the ASEAN
egion market. Another interesting point, is how countries with
arge number of banks result in lower H-Statistic,  compared to
ountries with less number of banks. In Singapore and Indonesia
ases, this can be explained by the fact that the biggest banks in
he country (in terms of total asset) tend to dominate the domestic
arket in terms of customer base, market presence and fran-
hise, benefited from market power. Furthermore, as before, we
pply the rolling estimation to examine the trend of competi-
ion in each country’s banking market. The results are presented
n Table 6. In Appendix A (Graph A1), we also present the
ompetition trend (H-Statistic  rolling trend) per ASEAN-5 coun-
ry throughout each period window. Analysing two windows
eriod before and after the endorsement of ASEAN Financial
ntegration Framework (AFIF) and the creation of the Bank-
ng Integration Framework, we show variances in the change of
ach country’s banking competition landscape. Although it is
ot necessarily enough to depict the actual changes in the mar-
et, one can argue that there is no clear sign of convergence of
he competitiveness across the region.
Following the announcement of the banking integrationpproached on responding to the coming changes. Countries like
alaysia and Singapore, take a more outward-looking approach
12 Given these results, it is not necessary to perform the disequilibrium
pproach. However, for robustness purposes, we also carry out the disequilibrium
pproach using the one-step GMM dynamic panel estimator.
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Table 3
Equilibrium test on ASEAN-5 and country level for 2007–2016.
Dependent variable: lnROA* ASEAN5 Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
lnP1 −0.002 −0.004 −0.002 0.003 0.008* 0.007
(0.317) (0.291) (0.171) (0.440) (0.091) (0.250)
lnP2 0.000 −0.002 0.004** −0.001 0.001 −0.003
(0.697) (0.421) (0.013) (0.381) (0.328) (0.278)
lnP3 0.001 0.002 0.000 −0.007** −0.001 −0.005
(0.634) (0.285) (0.711) (0.048) (0.192) (0.190)
lnEQAST 0.001 −0.003 0.001 0.002 −0.001 0.009***
(0.751) (0.201) (0.537) (0.482) (0.832) (0.004)
lnAST 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003
(0.685) (0.929) (0.631) (0.470) (0.619) (0.310)
lnLOANAST 0.002* 0.001 0.004*** −0.002 −0.002 0.002
(0.087) (0.921) (0.000) (0.145) (0.491) (0.784)
lnCASHDEP −0.001* −0.001* 0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002*
(0.057) (0.052) (0.422) (0.282) (0.479) (0.055)
lnOBSAST 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 −0.001 −0.001
(0.709) (0.728) (0.712) (0.465) (0.501) (0.167)
CONS −0.003 −0.020 0.013 0.002 0.044 0.020
(0.823) (0.404) (0.350) (0.940) (0.187) (0.210)
Estat (E) −0.002 −0.004 0.002 −0.006 0.008 0.000
Ftest (E = 0) 0.52 0.60 2.47 0.92 2.05 0.00
Prob > F 0.471 0.440 0.124 0.348 0.212 0.953
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. P-values are in parentheses.
Notes: lnROA* = 1 + Return on Asset; lnP1 = personnel expenses/total assets; lnP2 = interest expenses/customer and short term funding; lnP3 = total capital
expenses/total fixed assets; lnEQAST = equity/total assets; lnAST = total asset; lnLOANAST = total loans/total assets; ln CASHDEP = cash and due from insti-
tutions/total deposits; lnOBSAST = off-balance-sheet activities/total assets.
Table 4
Rolling equilibrium test on ASEAN-5 Level for 2007–2016.
Dependent variable: lnROA* 2007–2011 2008–2012 2009–2013 2010–2014 2011–2015 2012–2016
lnP1 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002 0.000 0.004
(0.447) (0.826) (0.744) (0.711) (0.919) (0.260)
lnP2 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 −0.002 −0.07**
(0.393) (0.334) (0.508) (0.526) (0.371) (0.037)
lnP3 −0.003 0.000 0.001 0.002** 0.001 0.001
(0.147) (0.945) (0.470) (0.020) (0.579) (0.696)
lnEQAST 0.008*** 0.004* 0.002 0.000 0.000 −0.003
(0.008) (0.093) (0.488) (0.967) (0.984) (0.285)
lnAST 0.004** 0.005*** 0.004* 0.002 0.003 0.004
(0.034) (0.008) (0.100) (0.502) (0.369) (0.276)
lnLOANAST 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003** 0.002 0.001
(0.518) (0.544) (0.218) (0.036) (0.234) (0.611)
lnCASHDEP 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.001 −0.001*** −0.001***
(0.549) (0.634) (0.950) (0.139) (0.008) (0.003)
lnOBSAST 0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.343) (0.315) (0.471) (0.278) (0.885) (0.842)
CONS −0.001 −0.010 −0.016 −0.008 −0.020 −0.036
(0.962) (0.694) (0.517) (0.631) (0.436) (0.307)
Estat (E) −0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001 −0.002 −0.002
Ftest (E = 0) 1.17 0.06 0.01 0.17 0.23 0.20
Prob > F 0.2816 0.8078 0.9344 0.6801 0.6357 0.6522
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. P-values are in parentheses.








xpenses/total fixed assets; lnEQAST = equity/total assets; lnAST = total asse
utions/total deposits; lnOBSAST = off-balance-sheet activities/total assets.
ocusing on strengthening their presence in regional market.
ther countries, like Indonesia and Philippines, take a more
nward-looking strategy in order to protect their own local banks’




OANAST = total loans/total assets; ln CASHDEP = cash and due from insti-
ell as increased restrictions on foreign ownership and activi-
ies, they aim to expand their domestic business capacity in order
o survive from the incoming foreign competition. Meanwhile,
anks from Thailand take a combination strategy of strengthen-
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Table 5
Competition at the ASEAN-5 Level and at a country level for 2007–2016.
Dependent variable: lnTR ASEAN5 Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
lnP1 0.260*** 0.223*** 0.270*** 0.418*** 0.114 0.424***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.350) (0.000)
lnP2 0.289*** 0.241*** 0.401*** 0.219*** 0.336*** 0.343***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
lnP3 0.015 −0.001 0.062* −0.112 −0.012 0.056*
(0.293) (0.916) (0.056) (0.131) (0.672) (0.081)
lnEQAST 0.012 −0.046 0.094 −0.014 −0.149 0.008
(0.634) (0.126) (0.149) (0.760) (0.160) (0.884)
lnAST −0.042 −0.054** −0.026 −0.044 −0.199* −0.002
(0.107) (0.018) (0.658) (0.607) (0.070) (0.968)
lnLOANAST 0.158*** 0.215** 0.139*** 0.127*** 0.361** 0.227**
(0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.010) (0.016) (0.048)
lnCASHDEP 0.004 0.004 0.019 −0.026* 0.017 0.010
(0.527) (0.611) (0.222) (0.086) (0.490) (0.663)
lnOBSAST 0.000 0.007 −0.021 0.004 −0.002 0.014
(0.964) (0.389) (0.126) (0.677) (0.916) (0.206)
CONS −0.057 −0.292* 0.298 0.432 0.917 0.548**
(0.743) (0.077) (0.471) (0.293) (0.325) (0.037)
Hstat (H) 0.564 0.463 0.733 0.525 0.438 0.823
Ftest (H = 0) 71.63*** 57.83*** 27.99*** 10.19*** 9.43** 103.69***
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.028 0.000
Ftest (H = 1) 42.77*** 77.84*** 3.73* 8.33*** 15.50** 4.81**
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.061 0.009 0.011 0.040

















































Based on the estimation result above, it can be seen that the
factors significantly affect the H-Statistic  are the CR3 (proxy
for market concentration) and DEPKM2 (proxy for density ofotes: TR = total revenue; lnP1 = personnel expenses/total assets; lnP2 = interes
ssets; lnEQAST = equity/total assets; lnAST = total asset; lnLOANAST = tota
nOBSAST = off-balance-sheet activities/total assets.
ng its domestic foundation while at the same time enhancing its
egional presence. Overall, there is still a high level of hetero-
eneity among the ASEAN banking market and sure banking
ntegration is a challenging objective for the region. Therefore,
t remains critical for policymakers to create a playing level field
n order to improve market environment though harmonisation
f regulation and enhancement of competition in the region.
An analysis of the sign and significance of the regression
oefficients (Tables 5 and 6) indicate that the price of funds
s always positive and statistical significant for all countries.
he price of labour is positive and statistical significant in most
ountries (with the exception of Singapore). The impact of the
ost of capital seems to be minimal compared to the other input
rices. These results are consistent with previous studies not only
or the ASEAN banking market but also for other countries’ and
egions (Liu et al., 2012).
To validate our results we conduct the Goddard and Wilson’s
2009) disequilibrium test for robustness purposes. The results
rom the one-step dynamic Generalized Method of Moments
GMM) estimation are presented in Table 7. Similar to Liu et al.
2012), we do not find a positive and statistically significant
agged-dependent variable in all observed countries. The varying
ign and significance indicates the lack of necessity to include a
artial adjustment mechanism to produce the dynamic revenue
quation. Nonetheless, confirming the result obtained from fixed
ffect estimators (as laid out in Tables 5 and 6), the positive and
tatistically significant coefficient for the price of funds remain
onsistent for all countries and at the ASEAN-5 level. Further-
ore, the results for the coefficient estimates of the other two rnses/customer and short term funding; lnP3 = total capital expenses/total fixed
s/total assets; ln CASHDEP = cash and due from institutions/total deposits;
nput prices and the control variables are broadly in-line with the
esults derived from the fixed effect estimators. Table 8 presents
he comparison between the result obtained from FE and GMM
stimation.
Overall, the GMM method produces higher H-Statistic  esti-
ated compared to the fixed effects procedure. This is in line
ith Goddard and Wilson (2009) and Liu et al. (2012) who
uggest that the static H-Statistics  produced by fixed effects
as the tendency to underestimate the competition level. More-
ver, in-line with the results from the fixed effects procedure,
he GMM confirms that the ASEAN banking market operates
nder monopolistic competition throughout the observed period
2007–2016).
.2.  Determinants  of  competition
This section presents the results of the relationship of the
ndependent variables with the competitiveness measure. Table 9
llustrates the results. The regression was run using two different
roxies for concentration, CR3 and CR5, which gave us similar
esults and, for the purpose of this paper, we only report the
stimation result based on the use of CR3 measure.1313 The results for CR5 are not reported in the tables but are available upon
equest from the authors.
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Table 6
Rolling analysis at a country level.
Country Period lnP1 lnP2 lnP3 H-Stat H0: Hstat = 0 H0: Hstat = 1 Competition
ID 2007–2011 0.132*** 0.181*** −0.030 0.283 F(1,65) = 11.33*** F(1,65) = 72.44*** MC
2008–2012 0.199*** 0.182*** −0.026 0.355 F(1,78) = 11.99*** F(1,78) = 39.48*** MC
2009–2013 0.236*** 0.181*** −0.018 0.398 F(1,107) = 16.69*** F(1,107) = 38.08*** MC
2010–2014 0.239*** 0.270*** 0.000 0.509 F(1,112) = 66.65*** F(1,112) = 62.24*** MC
2011–2015 0.196*** 0.297*** −0.003 0.490 F(1,113) = 102.05*** F(1,113) = 110.33*** MC
2012–2016 0.260*** 0.335*** 0.009 0.604 F(1,111) = 35.47*** F(1,111) = 15.23*** MC
MY 2007–2011 0.292*** 0.570*** 0.081** 0.942 F(1,38) = 234.40*** F(1,38) = 0.88 MC-PC
2008–2012 0.431*** 0.291** 0.088*** 0.809 F(1,39) = 48.60*** F(1,39) = 2.69 MC-PC
2009–2013 0.126 0.207*** 0.015 0.348 F(1,39) = 10.59*** F(1,39) = 37.30*** MC
2010–2014 0.155 0.176* 0.011 0.342 F(1,39) = 9.24*** F(1,39) = 34.12*** MC
2011–2015 0.200 0.155* 0.074** 0.430 F(1,39) = 8.83*** F(1,39) = 15.57*** MC
2012–2016 0.237** 0.234*** 0.052 0.523 F(1,38) = 14.14*** F(1,38) = 11.77*** MC
PH 2007–2011 0.474*** 0.217*** −0.051 0.640 F(1,22) = 19.77*** F(1,22) = 6.24** MC
2008–2012 0.529*** 0.139* 0.071 0.739 F(1,22) = 45.80*** F(1,22) = 5.74** MC
2009–2013 0.426*** 0.198** 0.058 0.682 F(1,22) = 18.25*** F(1,22) = 3.99* MC
2010–2014 0.477*** 0.275*** 0.208** 0.960 F(1,22) = 59.67*** F(1,22) = 0.10 MC-PC
2011–2015 0.578*** 0.253*** 0.208** 1.038 F(1,22) = 95.21*** F(1,22) = 0.13 PC
2012–2016 0.406*** 0.208*** 0.097 0.710 F(1,21) = 25.28*** F(1,21) = 4.21* MC
SG 2007–2011 −0.068 0.348*** 0.009 0.289 F(1,5) = 3.15 F(1,5) = 18.97*** M-MC
2008–2012 0.032 0.431** −0.022 0.440 F(1,5) = 1.77 F(1,5) = 2.85 M-PC
2009–2013 0.543* 0.277** −0.072** 0.749 F(1,5) = 22.05*** F(1,5) = 2.48 MC-PC
2010–2014 0.707** 0.157 −0.038 0.825 F(1,5) = 56.63*** F(1,5) = 2.53 MC-PC
2011–2015 0.751 0.084 0.050 0.885 F(1,5) = 7.68** F(1,5) = 0.13 MC-PC
2012–2016 0.603* 0.100** −0.018 0.117 F(1,5) = 9.69** F(1,5) = 2.05 MC-PC
TH 2007–2011 0.242 0.266*** 0.083* 0.592 F(1,19) = 3.41* F(1,19) = 11.62 MC-PC
2008–2012 0.332* 0.316*** 0.107*** 0.755 F(1,19) = 16.33*** F(1,19) = 1.72 MC-PC
2009–2013 0.411*** 0.389*** 0.061** 0.862 F(1,19) = 72.98*** F(1,19) = 1.86 MC-PC
2010–2014 0.470*** 0.277*** 0.076** 0.823 F(1,20) = 228.10*** F(1,20) = 10.49*** MC
2011–2015 0.500*** 0.383*** 0.052 0.935 F(1,20) = 162.88*** F(1,20) = 0.79 PC
2012–2016 0.480*** 0.356*** 0.006 0.841 F(1,20) = 84.76*** F(1,20) = 3.03* MC
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Notes: ID = Indonesia; MY = Malaysia; PH = Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand.




































ompetition type: MC = monopolistic competition; PC = perfect competition; M
nP = personnel expenses/total assets; lnP2 = interest expenses/customer and sho
emand). The coefficient of the concentration measure, although
t is significantly affect H-Statistic, but it affects the H-Statistic in
 positive way, which means that the more concentrated bank-
ng systems are more competitive. This result differ from the
revious literature, which indicates that an increase in concen-
ration impairs competition (Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Khan et al.,
017a). Similar to our result, Claessens and Laeven (2004) find
 positive and statistically significant relationship between con-
entration measure and H-Statistic. However, as the authors
oint out these differences in relationship between concentra-
ion measure and competition measure suggest that the degree
f concentration may not be the proper indicator for level of
 market’s competitiveness. Hence, they cannot explain each
ther.
The positive and significant relationship between density of
emand (DEPKM2) and competitive measure indicates that an
ncrease in density of demand would also increase the competi-
ion level in a country. As expected, an increase in demand for
anking products in one area may attract banks from another
rea to enter the market to pursue the increasing new business





m funding; lnP3 = total capital expenses/total fixed assets.
etition level as a result. The INTERM variable, which proxies
he intermediation ratio, is negatively related with the competi-
ion measure, although not statistically significant. Finally, the
ANKSPOP variable (proxy for density of banks) is positively
elated with the competition measure, however again not statis-
ically significant.
.  Conclusions
The endorsement of the ASEAN Financial Integration
ramework (AFIF) in 2011, to support the creation of a globally
ompetitive single market, has highlighted the importance of a
anking integration in the ASEAN region, especially given that
ommercial banking is still the backbone of the region’s financial
ystem. As evident, an integrated banking market can increase
ompetition, improve efficiency and the quality of financial ser-
ices. Hence, we could expect strong and competitive regional
anks that can compete not only against each other, but also
gainst global banks.
Moving towards the full implementation of the ASEAN
anking Integration Framework (ABIF), this paper examines the
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Table 7
One-step dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation.
Dependent variable: lnTR ASEAN5 INDO MALAY PHIL SING THAI
lntrL1. 0.234*** 0.319*** 0.090 0.234** 0.102 −0.062
(0.000) (0.001) (0.154) (0.044) (0.541) (0.300)
lnP1 0.196*** 0.054 0.221** 0.408 0.527*** 0.401***
(0.005) (0.582) (0.015) (0.252) (0.009) (0.002)
lnP2 0.296*** 0.395*** 0.255*** 0.192** 0.168** 0.356***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.031) (0.001)
lnP3 0.085** 0.018 0.032 0.185 0.017 0.008
(0.042) (0.740) (0.606) (0.196) (0.799) (0.849)
LnEQAST 0.052* 0.016 0.064 0.100 0.019 0.009
(0.064) (0.754) (0.332) (0.319) (0.809) (0.828)
lnAST −0.089*** −0.096** −0.137*** −0.158 −0.112 −0.125
(0.002) (0.025) (0.000) (0.406) (0.372) (0.114)
lnLOANAST 0.173*** 0.315*** 0.203*** −0.003 −0.019 0.164***
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.976) (0.893) (0.009)
lnCASHDEP −0.003 −0.009* 0.004 −0.019 0.044 −0.035
(0.569) (0.078) (0.780) (0.144) (0.295) (0.215)
lnOBSAST −0.004 −0.001 −0.027 0.007 0.037 0.007
(0.523) (0.908) (0.101) (0.666) (0.164) (0.472)
Hstat 0.753 0.685 0.559 1.024 0.792 0.721
Hansen p 0.421 0.383 0.152 0.687 1.000 0.607
AR(2) 0.558 0.110 0.470 0.820 0.695 0.329
No. of instruments 37 33 37 21 15 17
No. of groups 201 112 40 23 6 20
No. of observation 1062 488 253 135 38 148
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Notes: lnTRL1 = lagged dependent variable; lnP1 = personnel expenses/total assets; lnP2 = interest expenses/customer and short term funding; lnP3 = total cap-
ital expenses/total fixed assets; lnEQAST = equity/total assets; lnAST = total asset; lnLOANAST = total loans/total assets; ln CASHDEP = cash and due from
institutions/total deposits; lnOBSAST = off-balance-sheet activities/total assets.
Table 8
Comparison of static FE and dynamic GMM.
Dependent variable: lnTR & LnTRL1 ASEAN5 Indonesia Malaysia
FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM
lnP1 0.260*** 0.196*** 0.223*** 0.054 0.270*** 0.221**
lnP2 0.289*** 0.296*** 0.241*** 0.395*** 0.401*** 0.255***
lnP3 0.015 0.085** −0.001 0.018 0.062* 0.032
lnEQAST 0.012 0.052* −0.046 0.016 0.094 0.064
LnAST −0.042 −0.089*** −0.054** −0.096** −0.026 −0.137***
lnLOANAST 0.158*** 0.173*** 0.215** 0.315*** 0.139*** 0.203***
lnCASHDEP 0.004 −0.003 0.004 −0.009* 0.019 0.004
lnOBSAST 0.000 −0.004 0.007 −0.001 −0.021 −0.027
Hstat 0.564 0.753 0.463 0.685 0.733 0.559
Dependent variable: lnTR * LnTRL1 Philippines Singapore Thailand
FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM
lnP1 0.418*** 0.408 0.114 0.527*** 0.424*** 0.401***
lnP2 0.219*** 0.192** 0.336*** 0.168** 0.343*** 0.356***
lnP3 −0.112 0.185 −0.012 0.017 0.056* 0.008
lnEQAST −0.014 0.100 −0.149 0.019 0.008 0.009
lnAST −0.044 −0.158 −0.199* −0.112 −0.002 −0.125
lnLOANAST 0.127*** −0.003 0.361** −0.019 0.227** 0.164***
lnCASHDEP −0.026* −0.019 0.017 0.044 0.010 −0.035
lnOBSAST 0.004 0.007 −0.002 0.037 0.014 0.007
Hstat 0.525 1.024 0.438 0.792 0.823 0.721
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Notes: lnTRL1 = lagged dependent variable; TR = total revenue; lnP1 = personnel expenses/total assets; lnP2 = interest expenses/customer and short term funding;
lnP3 = total capital expenses/total fixed assets; lnEQAST = equity/total assets; lnAST = total asset; lnLOANAST = total loans/total assets; ln CASHDEP = cash and
due from institutions/total deposits; lnOBSAST = off-balance-sheet activities/total assets.
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Table 9
Determinants of H-Statistic.
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t P > |t|
CR3 1.116*** 0.092 12.070 0.000
DEPKM2 0.433** 0.110 3.940 0.017
INTERM −0.666 0.775 −0.860 0.439
BANKSPOP 0.246 0.121 2.040 0.111
Cons −4.772*** 0.219 −21.750 0.000
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Notes: CR3 is the concentration ratio (proxy for market structure); DEPKM2 is


























































otal loans over total deposits (proxy for intermediation function); BANKSPOP
s bank branches per 100,000 adults (proxy for density of banks).
haracteristic of the ASEAN banking markets’ competition for
he period 2007–2016. The competition level is measured using
he Panzar and Rosse (1987) statistic. The trend and evolution
f the ASEAN countries’ banking markets are then examined
sing a rolling estimation with 5-year window. Furthermore, as
 robustness check, we also test our results using the generalized
ethod of moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimation, as sug-
ested by Goddard and Wilson (2009). Both the fixed effects and
he GMM estimation results indicate monopolistic competition
n the ASEAN banking market, a result in line with previous
tudies (e.g. Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Liu et al., 2012). This
esult is also confirmed by each country’s’ H-Statistic which are
ll between 0 and 1, although varies across counties (Indonesia:
.463; Malaysia: 0.733; Philippines: 0.525; Singapore: 0.438;
nd Thailand: 0.823). The varying H-Statistic  explains the dif-
erent nature of each the ASEAN banking markets, especially
n terms of development stage and their ability to maintain the
overeignty of its banking sector.
This heterogeneity is also observed in the trend/evolution
f each country’s banking market competition throughout the
bserved period, where in general shows that the markets have tendency to move towards either monopolistic or perfect
ompetition. There are also differences in the change of com-




t Finance 8 (2018) 127–140
nd after (2012–2016) the implementation of AFIF. Although
hese results alone are not necessarily enough to depict the actual
ondition on how each national react towards the implementa-
ion of AFIF, but it is safe to say that countries with different
ompetition level may react differently towards an increased
ompetition. Therefore, the creation of a level playing field by
SEAN competition policymakers is crucial to ensure harmo-
ization and conduciveness of the ASEAN banking market after
he implementation of ABIF, which eventually shall boost the
ompetition level evenly across the region.
Our findings on the relationship between competition and
everal country characteristics suggests a significant and posi-
ive relationship between market concentration and competition.
he results also suggest that a higher density of demand makes
he ASEAN banking market more competitive. With ASEAN’s
arge population and still huge pool of untapped businesses,
specially in less developed areas and areas where the middle
ncome population is rising such as Indonesia, an increase in
emand for banking products can be expected and hence the
ncrease in competition. These results seem to indicate that the
eterogeneity is the main characteristic of the ASEAN banking
arkets, which poses a challenge for the ASEAN policymakers
n the implementation of the ABIF because each nation may react
ifferently to the changes (i.e. more liberalization and increased
ompetition) in the banking market. Nonetheless, the increased
ompetition shall not threatened the region’s financial stability
s long as the right regulations are in place.
Overall, our findings suggest important policy implications
egarding anti-trust policies and financial stability, especially
fter the global financial crisis of 2008-09, which prompted pol-
cy makers to search for new regulatory and supervisory tools.
n important policy implication of this evidence is that pol-
cy makers need to consider whether the implementation of
he ABIF indeed increase the level of competition in ASEAN
nd whether there is an impact of increased competition on the
egion’s overall financial stability.ppendix  A.


















































































Graph A1. H-Statistic r
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